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Buchanan: Immunity from Wrongful Death Liability

NOTE
Immunity from Wrongful Death Liability:
How Mickels Fails to Compensate
Mickels v. Danrad, 486 S.W.3d 327 (Mo. 2016) (en banc)

Kevin Buchanan*

I. INTRODUCTION
Wrongful death statutes originated out of a need to compensate the family
of a decedent “whose life was wrongfully taken.”1 Closely related to wrongful
death statutes are survivorship statutes, which allow for the transmission of tort
claims after the death of one or more of the parties.2 These statutes help address
the once common maxim that it’s cheaper to kill a man than to maim him.3
Today, all fifty states have both wrongful death and survivorship statutes.4
In Mickels v. Danrad, the Supreme Court of Missouri declined to allow
wrongful death claims where a defendant’s negligence accelerates the death of
a terminally ill decedent.5 However, the court determined that a decedent’s
family may have a survivorship claim for personal injuries not resulting in
death.6 In doing so, the court perpetuated a trend that fails to accomplish the
intended goal of wrongful death statutes: to compensate a decedent’s family.7
Part II of this Note looks at the facts and holding of Mickels. Part III
examines the wrongful death and survivorship claims as well as the past precedent of such claims in the context of medical malpractice and improper diagnoses. Part IV then introduces the wrongful death and survivorship issues presented in Mickels. Finally, Part V distinguishes Mickels from precedent and
argues in favor of the dissent.
*

B.A., New York University, 2015; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of
Law, 2018; Note and Comment Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2017–2018. I would like
to extend a special thank you to Professor Philip G. Peters and the entire Missouri Law
Review staff for their support and guidance in writing this Note.
1. Wex S. Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1043, 1044
(1965).
2. Id.
3. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 127
(5th ed. 1984).
4. Jonathan James, Comment, Denial of Recovery to Nonresident Beneficiaries
Under Washington’s Wrongful Death and Survival Statutes: Is It Really Cheaper to
Kill a Man Than to Maim Him, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 663, 666 (2006).
5. Mickels v. Danrad, 486 S.W.3d 327, 331 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 332 (Teitelman, J., dissenting).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 14

844

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Joseph Mickels, Sr., visited the Hannibal Clinic in Hannibal, Missouri, on
December 8, 2008, “complaining of numbness and tingling in his left arm and
leg, blurred vision, and headaches.”8 An MRI9 was conducted on Mr. Mickels’s brain.10 Raman Danrad, a radiologist and the defendant in the instant case,
reviewed the results of the MRI on December 12.11 Dr. Danrad concluded that
Mr. Mickels’s MRI indicated no signs warranting a medical diagnosis.12
On February 17, 2009, Mr. Mickels went to Hannibal Regional Hospital
suffering from what was only described as an “altered mental status.”13 That
same day, a computed tomography (“CT”) scan14 was conducted on Mr. Mickels’s brain.15 Again, Dr. Danrad reviewed the results of this scan.16 Based on
the CT scan, Dr. Danrad diagnosed Mr. Mickels with a terminal and incurable
brain tumor.17 On June 12, 2009, Mr. Mickels died as a result of this tumor,
despite having undergone immediate treatment following his diagnosis.18
On June 7, 2012, Ruth Mickels, Joseph Mickels, Jr., Billy Joe Mickels,
Brittany Mickels, and Jennifer Unglesbee (“Appellants”) filed suit against Dr.
Danrad pursuant to Missouri’s wrongful death statute, Missouri Revised Statutes section 537.080.19
Appellants alleged that, although “Mr. Mickels certainly would have died
. . . with or without Dr. Danrad’s alleged negligence,” Mr. Mickels would not
have died on June 12, 2009, had Dr. Danrad properly diagnosed the brain tumor

8. Mickels v. Danrad, ED 101147, 2014 WL 7344250, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec.
23, 2014), vacated en banc, 486 S.W.3d 327 (Mo. 2016).
9. “MRI” is the common name for “Magnetic Resonance Imaging,” which “is a
non-invasive imaging technology that produces three dimensional detailed anatomical
images without the use of damaging radiation. It is often used for disease detection,
diagnosis, and treatment monitoring.” Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), NAT’L
INST. OF BIOMEDICAL IMAGING & BIOENGINEERING, https://www.nibib.nih.gov/science-education/science-topics/magnetic-resonance-imaging-mri (last visited Aug. 26,
2017).
10. Mickels, 486 S.W.3d at 328.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. A “CT Scan” is “a computerized x-ray imaging procedure in which a narrow
beam of x-rays is aimed at a patient and quickly rotated around the body, producing
signals that are processed by the machine’s computer to generate cross-sectional images – or ‘slices’ – of the body.” Computed Tomography (CT), NAT’L INST.
BIOMEDICAL IMAGING & BIOENGINEERING, https://www.nibib.nih.gov/science-education/science-topics/computed-tomography-ct (last visited Aug. 26, 2017).
15. Mickels, 486 S.W.3d at 328.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.; MO. REV. STAT. § 537.080 (2016).
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following the initial MRI on December 8, 2008.20 Mr. Mickels’s treating oncologist testified that while the tumor “was incurable when it was found and it
would have been incurable at the time” of the initial MRI on December 8, 2008,
it was “more likely than not that if [the tumor] had been discovered earlier . . .
[Mr. Mickels] would have lived an additional six months on average.”21
The trial court granted summary judgment in Dr. Danrad’s favor and dismissed Appellants’ petition. The court found that Appellants could not establish that Dr. Danrad’s negligence caused Mr. Mickels’s death in accordance
with section 537.080.1.22 Appellants appealed the trial court’s judgment.23
The appeal was transferred to the Supreme Court of Missouri under article V,
section 10 of the Missouri Constitution.24
The Supreme Court of Missouri vacated the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment and remanded the case.25 In doing so, the court held that because Dr.
Danrad’s failure to diagnose Mr. Mickels’s incurable brain tumor was not the
cause of Mr. Mickels’s death, Appellants did not have a cause of action against
Dr. Danrad for wrongful death under section 537.080.1.26 However, the court
held that Appellants did have a cause of action against Dr. Danrad under Missouri’s personal injury survivorship statute, Missouri Revised Statutes section
537.020.27

20. Mickels, 486 S.W.3d at 328.
21. Id. (alterations in original).
22. Id. Section 537.080.1 provides:
Whenever the death of a person results from any act, conduct, occurrence, transaction, or circumstance which, if death had not ensued, would have entitled such
person to recover damages in respect thereof, the person or party who . . . would
have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable in an action for damages,
notwithstanding the death of the person injured . . . .

§ 537.080.1.
23. Mickels v. Danrad, ED 101147, 2014 WL 7344250, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec.
23, 2014), vacated en banc, 486 S.W.3d 327 (Mo. 2016). In an opinion that was later
vacated, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Id.; see also MO. CONST. art. V, § 10 (“The supreme court may finally determine
all causes coming to it from the court of appeals, whether by certification, transfer or
certiorari, the same as on original appeal.”).
24. Mickels, 486 S.W.3d at 328.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 331.
27. Id. at 329; see MO. REV. STAT. § 537.020.1 (2016) (“Causes of action for personal injuries, other than those resulting in death, whether such injuries be to the health
or to the person of the injured party, shall not abate by reason of his death . . . .”).
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Wrongful Death and Survivorship
Historically, common law tort actions involving death suffered from two
primary limitations that led to major reform.28 First, common law tort actions
were said to “die with the person of either the plaintiff or the defendant.”29
Such a policy prevented “a deceased tort victim’s own existing cause of action
. . . [or] a deceased wrongdoer’s once existing liability” from transferring “to
the personal representative of either of them.”30 Survivorship statutes that allowed for “the transmission of tort claims or tort liability at death” were enacted to address this limitation.31
The second limitation was that “the death of a human being was not regarded as giving rise to any cause of action at common law on behalf of a living
person who was injured by reason of the death.”32 Due to this limitation, a
plaintiff had few rights “against another living person for having caused the
death of a third party whose life was of value to the plaintiff.”33 For example,
if a defendant caused a person’s death, the decedent’s family could not make a
claim against the defendant.34 Wrongful death statutes sought to address this
limitation by “establishing a separate cause of action for the benefit of designated members of the family of a person whose life was wrongfully taken.”35
Additionally, such statutes solved the problem of “the much-criticized rule of
the common law which made it ‘more profitable for the defendant to kill the
plaintiff than to scratch him’” by preventing defendants from escaping liability
after the death of a plaintiff.36
All fifty states now have survivorship and wrongful death statutes, although their forms vary.37 In Missouri, “the survivorship statute and the wrongful death statute are mutually antagonistic.”38 “[W]hen the injury alleged did
not cause death,” Missouri’s survivorship statute, section 537.020 applies.39
Section 537.080, Missouri’s wrongful death statute, “applies when the injury
did cause death.”40
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Malone, supra note 1, at 1044.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
O’Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 909 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (quoting
WILLIAM PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 127 (4th ed. 1971)).
37. See William A. Gage, Jr., Casenote, Yowell v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 703
S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1986), 18 SAINT MARY’S L.J. 1091, 1094–95 (1987).
38. Wollen v. DePaul Health Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Mo. 1992) (en banc).
39. Id.; see MO. REV. STAT. § 537.020 (2016).
40. Wollen, 828 S.W.2d at 685; see MO. REV. STAT. § 537.080 (2016).
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Missouri’s current survivorship statute provides that upon the death of a
party to an action for personal injury, a cause of action for personal injury
transfers to the personal representatives of the deceased.41 In other words, if a
plaintiff has a personal injury claim but dies before the matter is resolved, the
plaintiff’s personal representatives may go forward with the claim under the
survivorship statute.42 Missouri’s current wrongful death statute provides that
when a person’s death results from the acts of a defendant, the defendant is
liable for damages.43
Damages arising under the survivorship statute are not defined.44 For
claims arising under Missouri’s survivorship statute, courts have held that
plaintiffs are “entitled to recover only such damages as accrued before [the
decedent’s] death and which he could have recovered had he survived.”45 This
recovery may “includ[e] damages for physical and mental pain and suffering;
loss of wages, if any, from the [event] until his death; and medical and hospital
expenses resulting from the injuries sustained.”46
Under section 537.090, wrongful death claims under section 537.080 may
seek “such damages as the trier of the facts may deem fair and just.”47 In addition to “pecuniary losses suffered by reason of the death,” claimants may also
be awarded “the reasonable value of the services, consortium, companionship,
comfort, instruction, guidance, counsel, training, and support of which those
on whose behalf suit may be brought have been deprived by reason of such
death.”48
41. § 537.020.
42. Id.
43. § 537.080. Section 537.080 further provides that damages may be sued for:
(1) By the spouse or children or the surviving lineal descendants of any deceased children, natural or adopted, legitimate or illegitimate, or by the father
or mother of the deceased, natural or adoptive;
(2) If there be no persons in class (1) entitled to bring the action, then by the
brother or sister of the deceased, or their descendants, who can establish his or
her right to those damages set out in section 537.090 because of the death;
(3) If there be no persons in class (1) or (2) entitled to bring the action, then
by a plaintiff ad litem. Such plaintiff ad litem shall be appointed by the court
having jurisdiction over the action for damages provided in this section upon
application of some person entitled to share in the proceeds of such action.

Id.
44. See § 537.020.
45. Grizzell v. United States, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1007–08 (S.D. Ill. 2009) (con-

sidering § 537.020) (emphasis added); see also Adelsberger v. Sheehy, 79 S.W.2d 109,
114 (Mo. 1934) (noting that the plaintiff administrator is entitled to recover “only such
damages as accrued antecedent to the death” of the decedent that the decedent could
have recovered had he lived).
46. Grizzell, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1008.
47. MO. REV. STAT. § 537.090 (2016).
48. Id.
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Damages under Missouri’s wrongful death statute are consistent with the
“pecuniary loss rule,” which is the majority rule for damages for wrongful
death.49 A problem exists with the pecuniary loss rule in that it “effectively
values human life solely in terms of the monetary benefits the decedent could
have been expected to bestow upon his or her dependents” while “attach[ing]
no monetary value to life itself” by not accounting for the decedent’s lost life.50
In doing so, “[t]he pecuniary loss rule views humans as economic units, not as
sentient beings who live for purpose and pleasure.”51 Furthermore, Missouri
courts, along with courts in twenty-seven other states, have rejected awarding
damages for grief and mental anguish in wrongful death cases.52
In O’Grady v. Brown, the Supreme Court of Missouri described three underlying goals of Missouri’s wrongful death statute.53 The first of these goals
is “to provide compensation to bereaved plaintiffs for their loss.”54 Second,
the wrongful death statute should “ensure that tortfeasors pay for the consequences of their actions.”55 Finally, the statute should serve “generally to deter
harmful conduct which might lead to death.”56

B. Medical Malpractice
There are three categories of malignant diseases that are commonly encountered in medical malpractice actions.57
In the first category, a “cure is probable at the outset, but, as a result of
negligence, the chance of eradicating the disease has been lost.”58 For example, in Mezrah v. Bevis, a physician failed to diagnose a plaintiff’s breast cancer.59 The court found for the plaintiff because expert testimony demonstrated
that, if properly diagnosed, the “plaintiff’s breast cancer ‘more likely than not’
would have been completely cured.”60

49. Andrew J. McClurg, Dead Sorrow: A Story About Loss and a New Theory of
Wrongful Death Damages, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1, 6 (2005).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 6–7.
52. Id. at 28.
53. O’Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 909 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
54. Id.; see Price v. Schnitker, 239 S.W.2d 296, 300 (Mo. 1951) (interpreting section 537.090 as not allowing the jury to “take into consideration or award any damages
on account of the pain, anguish or bereavement which may have been suffered by the
parents or surviving sister”).
55. O’Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 909.
56. Id.
57. Cyril Toker, The Impact of Gooding on Actions for Malpractice in the Treatment of Malignant Disease, 74 FLA. B.J. 61, 62 (2000).
58. Id.
59. Mezrah v. Bevis, 593 So. 2d 1214, 1214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
60. Id. (citing Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1018 (Fla.
1984)).
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In the second category, while the patient is living with an incurable disease, the patient’s “life expectancy, already shortened by the disease, has been
reduced even further through negligence.”61 For example, in Noor v. Continental Casualty Co., a physician delayed a biopsy of the plaintiff’s breast lump
for approximately seven months and then made a diagnosis of breast cancer.62
The plaintiff sued the physician for “negligent diminution in life expectancy.”63
Her claim was dismissed because the plaintiff was “unable to present any nonspeculative evidence as to what extent, if any, [the physician’s] failure to immediately diagnose [the plaintiff’s] disease added to [the plaintiff’s] decreased
life expectancy.”64 This category is known as “[r]eduction in [l]ife [e]xpectancy from [n]egligence.”65
In the third category, the cure for the disease is improbable and “the patient has died prematurely as a result of negligence.”66 This last category is the
typical wrongful death case.67 In an ordinary wrongful death case, when a terminally ill patient prematurely dies as a result of a negligent diagnosis, “the
outcome . . . may depend upon the anticipated length of survival in the absence
of negligence.”68 If the anticipated survival period “would have been short
even with proper treatment, recovery appears to be unlikely.”69 However, if
the survival period “might have been prolonged” with a proper diagnosis, “recovery is possible even though, ultimately, a fatal outcome was expected.”70
In Missouri, plaintiffs must establish three elements for a prima facie
medical malpractice case.71 First, a plaintiff must prove “that an act or omission . . . of the defendant failed to meet the requisite medical standard of
care.”72 Second, a plaintiff must show “that the act or omission was performed
negligently.”73 Finally, a plaintiff must establish “a causal connection between
the act or omission and the plaintiff’s injury.”74
Furthermore, under Missouri Revised Statutes section 538.215, there are
five categories of damages available in medical malpractice cases: “(1) [p]ast
economic damages; (2) [p]ast noneconomic damages; (3) [f]uture medical
damages; (4) [f]uture economic damages, excluding future medical damages;
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Toker, supra note 57, at 62.
Noor v. Cont’l. Cas. Co., 508 So. 2d 363, 364 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
Toker, supra note 57, at 63.
Noor, 508 So. 2d at 365.
Toker, supra note 57, at 62.
Id.; see generally Williams v. Bay Hosp., Inc., 471 So. 2d 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); Tappan v. Fla. Med. Ctr., Inc., 488 So. 2d 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986);
Green v. Goldberg, 557 So. 2d 589 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam).
67. Toker, supra note 57, at 62.
68. Id. at 63.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Wilson v. Lockwood, 711 S.W.2d 545, 550 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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and (5) [f]uture noneconomic damages.”75 Additionally, Missouri Revised
Statutes section 538.210 creates a cap on noneconomic damages for medical
malpractice.76 In Watts v. Lester E. Cox Medical Centers, the Supreme Court
of Missouri found this cap to be “unconstitutional to the extent that it infringes
on the jury’s constitutionally protected purpose of determining the amount of
damages sustained by an injured party.”77 The court reasoned that “[s]uch a
limitation was not permitted at common law when Missouri’s constitution first
was adopted in 1820 and, therefore, violates the right to trial by jury guaranteed
by article I, section 22(a) of the Missouri Constitution.”78
However, in Dodson v. Ferrara, when applying the statutory damage cap
to medical malpractice resulting in death, the Supreme Court of Missouri determined the cap was constitutional because “Missouri does not recognize a
common law wrongful death claim.”79 Therefore, because wrongful death actions in Missouri are “statutory creation[s]” rather than common law actions,
such actions are “subject to statutory caps and limitations.”80
The Dodson court reasoned that there was a public interest in capping
wrongful death damages in order “to reduce perceived rising medical malpractice premiums and prevent physicians from leaving ‘high risk’ medical
fields.”81 Nonetheless, by protecting doctors in this way, not only are plaintiffs
in medical malpractice cases not properly compensated, but attorneys have a
decreased incentive to take medical malpractice cases.82 This potentially
makes it more difficult for injured plaintiffs to get into court.
While the Dodson court noted that “the legislature created the damages
cap in an effort to reduce perceived rising medical malpractice premiums and
prevent physicians from leaving ‘high risk’ medical fields,” it did not “evaluate

75. MO. REV. STAT. § 538.215 (2016). “Economic damages” are defined as “damages arising from pecuniary harm including, without limitation, medical damages, and
those damages arising from lost wages and lost earning capacity.” MO. REV. STAT. §
538.205(2) (2016). “Medical damages” are defined as “damages arising from reasonable expenses for necessary drugs, therapy, and medical, surgical, nursing, x-ray, dental, custodial and other health and rehabilitative services.” § 538.205(7). “Noneconomic damages” are defined as “damages arising from nonpecuniary harm including,
without limitation, pain, suffering, mental anguish, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, loss of capacity to enjoy life, and loss of consortium but shall not
include punitive damages.” § 538.205(8).
76. MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (2016).
77. Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 636 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
78. Id.
79. Dodson v. Ferrara, 491 S.W.3d 542, 558 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).
80. Id. at 550.
81. Id. at 561.
82. Carol J. Miller & Joseph Weidhaas, Medical Malpractice Noneconomic Caps
Unconstitutional, 69 J. MO. B. 344, 350 (2013) (“Where out-of-pocket costs are low,
there is a disincentive for attorneys to take cases, especially when noneconomic damages and punitive damages are capped.”).
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the wisdom or desirability of the policy decisions made by the legislature when
it passed section 538.210.”83

C. Past Precedent Regarding Failure to Diagnose
Prior to 2016, the highest courts of Florida, Ohio, and Iowa addressed the
issue of wrongful death claims arising from medical malpractice due to a failure to diagnose conditions that would have resulted in death even if properly
diagnosed.84 In all three of these cases discussed below,85 the courts determined that the plaintiffs failed to establish a causal connection between the act
and the plaintiff’s death.
In Gooding v. University Hospital Building, Inc., the Florida Supreme
Court addressed this issue.86 In Gooding, the decedent’s family brought suit
against a hospital after the hospital’s emergency room staff failed to check the
decedent’s medical history or to examine the decedent upon his arrival to the
emergency room with lower abdominal pain.87 The staff failed to examine the
patient because they were waiting for the doctor who had neglected to respond
to repeated paging.88 The decedent went into cardiac arrest and died forty-five
minutes after arriving at the hospital.89 It was later determined that the decedent “died from a ruptured abdominal aortic aneurysm which caused massive
internal bleeding.”90
The court concluded that “a jury could not reasonably find that but for the
negligent failure to properly diagnose and treat [the decedent] he would not
have died” because the plaintiff’s testimony failed to prove “that immediate
diagnosis and surgery more likely than not would have enabled [the decedent]
to survive.”91 Subsequently, the court found that the plaintiff did not show that
the defendant could have delayed death.92 The court further held “that a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action must show more than a decreased chance
of survival because of a defendant’s conduct.”93 Hence, “the plaintiff must
show that what was done or failed to be done probably would have affected the
outcome.”94
83. Dodson, 491 S.W.3d at 561.
84. Mickels v. Danrad, 486 S.W.3d 327, 329 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).
85. Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 1984); Cooper v.

Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., 272 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio 1971), overruled by Roberts
v. Ohio Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio 1996); Thompson v. Anderson, 252 N.W. 117 (Iowa 1934).
86. Gooding, 445 So. 2d at 1018.
87. Id. at 1017.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1017–18.
92. See id. at 1018.
93. Id. at 1020.
94. Id.
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In Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., the Supreme Court of
Ohio also addressed this issue.95 In Cooper, the court held that the plaintiff did
not have a claim for medical malpractice against a doctor who failed to properly
diagnose the decedent, who died later in the day after being sent home by the
doctor whom he visited after being hit by a truck.96 The court concluded that
“the issue of proximate cause can be submitted to a jury only if there is sufficient evidence showing that with proper diagnosis, treatment and surgery the
patient probably would have survived.”97 Such evidence of extended survival
was not presented.98
In Thompson v. Anderson, the Iowa Supreme Court addressed this issue.99
In Thompson, the decedent’s husband sued a doctor after the doctor failed to
diagnose the decedent with tetanus but instead told her that if she continued to
experience symptoms the next day, she should go to the hospital.100 The decedent continued to experience the symptoms, and she went to the hospital where
she was immediately diagnosed with tetanus and treated.101 She died the following day, two days after the doctor failed to diagnose her condition.102
The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s expert witness testimony “fail[ed]
to show any probability that the death . . . would not have resulted from tetanus,
regardless of any negligence or malpractice on the part of the [doctor].”103 Furthermore, the court determined “that any attempt to show that such death was
caused by any act or omission to act on the part of [the doctor], instead of by
the disease from which she was suffering, would be pure speculation.”104
Therefore, the court held that the plaintiff lacked a claim for wrongful death.105
Tappan v. Florida Medical Center, Inc.106 and Williams v. Bay Hospital,
107
Inc., both Florida District Court of Appeals cases, precluded wrongful death
actions but allowed the claims to proceed as survivorship actions.108

95. Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., 272 N.E.2d 97, 104 (Ohio
1971), overruled by Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Grp., 668 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio
1996).
96. Id. at 99, 104.
97. Id. at 98.
98. Id. at 104. Cooper was later overruled by Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Medical Group, which instead recognized the loss-of-chance theory and followed the approach of Section 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at
488.
99. Thompson v. Anderson, 252 N.W. 117, 120–21 (Iowa 1934).
100. Id. at 118.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 121.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Tappan v. Fla. Med. Ctr., Inc., 488 So. 2d 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
107. Williams v. Bay Hosp., Inc., 471 So. 2d 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
108. See id. at 629; see Tappan, 488 So. 2d at 631.
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In Tappan, the decedent’s wife sued a chiropractor, “alleging medical
malpractice because of [the chiropractor’s] failure to diagnose the [decedent’s
incurable] cancer during the period of time he was treating [the decedent] for
‘back and other pain.’”109 Relying on Gooding, the Florida court held that the
decedent’s wife did not have a cause for wrongful death because the chiropractor’s “alleged negligence in failing to diagnose the lung cancer was not a causein-fact of the death” and, therefore, it could not be proven “that with proper
diagnosis and treatment it was ‘more likely than not’ that [the decedent] would
have survived.”110 Nevertheless, the court allowed the claim to move forward
as a survivorship action.111
In Williams, the court again relied on Gooding in precluding a wrongful
death action when the results of a chest x-ray showing abnormalities were allegedly not reported to the decedent.112 The decedent was diagnosed with incurable lung cancer one year after the exam.113 The plaintiff’s expert testified
that early treatment would have, “within reasonable medical probability . . .
extended her life several months.”114 The court reasoned that a wrongful death
claim did not exist because the defendant’s “alleged negligence did not ‘more
likely than not’ ultimately cause [the decedent’s] death.”115 As in Tappan, the
Williams court allowed the claim to move forward as a survivorship action.116
In its reasoning, the Williams court cited to Martin v. United Security Services,
Inc.,117 which found a “wrongful death statute eliminating claims for pain and
suffering of the decedent” to be constitutional “because the act provided a suitable alternative to recovery of damages for such claims by substituting therefor
the right of close relatives to recover for their own pain and suffering occasioned by loss of a loved one.”118
However, in Green v. Goldberg, another Florida District Court of Appeals
case, the court found that the requirements of Gooding were met when testimony showed that the plaintiff would have survived an additional ten years if
she had been properly diagnosed with breast cancer.119

109. Tappan, 488 So. 2d at 630.
110. Id. at 631 (citing Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015 (Fla.

1984)).
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Williams, 471 So. 2d at 628, 630.
Id. at 628.
Id.
Id. at 630.
Id.
Id. at 629 (citing Martin v. United Sec. Servs., Inc., 314 So. 2d 765 (Fla.

1975)).
118. Id. (citing Martin, 314 So. 2d at 769).
119. Green v. Goldberg, 557 So. 2d 589, 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (per cu-

riam).
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In 2016, the Supreme Court of Missouri addressed the issues of wrongful
death and survivorship in a claim arising from a failure to diagnose in the instant case, Mickels v. Danrad.120

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In a majority opinion written by Judge Paul C. Wilson, the Supreme Court
of Missouri held in the instant case that Appellants’ wrongful death claim under
section 537.080.1 failed because Mr. Mickels’s death was not caused by Dr.
Danrad’s alleged negligence.121 Nevertheless, the court found that Appellants
did have a survivorship cause of action for negligence arising from Mr. Mickels’s personal injuries under section 537.020.122

A. The Majority Opinion
In determining that Appellants’ wrongful death claim failed under section
537.080.1, the court reasoned that, while Dr. Danrad’s alleged failure to diagnose Mr. Mickels’s brain tumor “certainly injured” Mr. Mickels, “it just as certainly did not kill him” because the tumor was incurable and terminal.123 The
court concluded that Appellants failed to prove that Mr. Mickels’s premature
death resulted from Dr. Danrad’s negligence as required by section 537.080.1,
and, therefore, Appellants could not sue for wrongful death.124 The court further noted that “[e]very state supreme court to address this issue ha[d] reached
the same conclusion.”125
The court concluded that, although Appellants did not have a wrongful
death claim, a claim existed against Dr. Danrad for personal injury under
“[s]ection 537.020 [which] provides: ‘Causes of action for personal injuries,
other than those resulting in death, whether such injuries be to the health or to
the person of the injured party, shall not abate by reason of his death.”126 The
court reasoned that, while “[a]n action for personal injuries that result in death

120. Mickels v. Danrad, 486 S.W.3d 327, 331 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).
121. Id. at 329.
122. Id. at 329–30. The court further noted that “Mr. Mickels [had] no claim for

‘lost chance survival’ . . . because all parties concede he could not have survived his
brain tumor regardless of whether Dr. Danrad was negligent in reviewing Mr. Mickels’
first MRI.” Id. at 329 n.3.
123. Id. at 329.
124. Id.; see MO. REV. STAT. § 537.080.1 (2016) (“Whenever the death of a person
results from any act . . . .”).
125. Mickels, 486 S.W.3d at 329 (citing Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445
So. 2d 1015, 1018 (Fla. 1984)); see also Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, 272
N.E.2d 97, 104 (Ohio 1971); Thompson v. Anderson, 252 N.W. 117, 120–21 (Iowa
1934).
126. Mickels, 486 S.W.3d at 329 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 537.020 (2000)).
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may only be brought under [section 537.080] . . . actions ‘other than those resulting in death’ may be brought under” section 537.020.127 As a result, Mr.
Mickels could have filed a personal injury claim against Dr. Danrad before he
died.128 Under section 537.020, this personal injury claim passed on to Mr.
Mickels’s personal representatives after his death.129
Therefore, the court determined that a personal injury claim against Dr.
Danrad could be made by Mr. Mickels’s personal representatives.130 This was
the same approach taken in the two previously mentioned Florida cases, Tappan131 and Williams.132
Additionally, the court determined that allowing Appellants’ wrongful
death claim would be “contrary to [the Supreme Court of Missouri’s] precedent
and the language of the wrongful death statute.”133 Furthermore, the court reasoned that allowing the wrongful death claim could cause unintended consequences in future wrongful death claims.134 The court noted that, among such
consequences, the precedent created by allowing Appellants’ wrongful death
claim would create a “new element of proof for wrongful death plaintiffs (i.e.,
that ‘but for’ the defendant’s negligence the decedent would not have died on
the specific time and date).”135
The court emphasized that this new element would allow defendants in
future wrongful death claims to “argue that, even when his or her negligence
caused the decedent’s death, some [other] conduct . . . either accelerated or
delayed that death and, therefore, that conduct – not the defendant’s negligence
– was the ‘but for’ cause of the decedent’s specific date and time of death.”136
The court concluded that allowing a survivorship personal injury claim under
section 537.020 avoids the potential problems by eliminating the requirement
of proving causation at the time of the decedent’s death.137 The court determined that the time of the decedent’s death should only be considered in the
damages analysis.138 Therefore, the court vacated the trial court’s judgment
and remanded the case.139

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. (quoting § 537.020).
Id. at 329–30.
Id. at 330.
Id. at 331.
Tappan v. Fla. Med. Ctr., Inc., 488 So. 2d 630, 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
Williams v. Bay Hosp., Inc., 471 So. 2d 626, 629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
Mickels, 486 S.W.3d at 331.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. The Dissenting Opinion
Judge Richard B. Teitelman authored a dissenting opinion joined by
Judge Laura Denvir Stith and Judge George W. Draper, III.140 In reasoning
that a reversal of the trial court’s judgment was proper, the dissent emphasized
that but for Dr. Danrad’s negligence, Mr. Mickels would have lived up to six
months longer.141 Therefore, the dissent concluded that the majority failed to
consider “that what results from the loss of an opportunity to delay death is
death.”142
They wrote that the majority erred in holding that section 537.080 requires the alleged negligence to be “the sole and exclusive cause of the
death.”143 The dissent further stressed that “[t]here is nothing in the plain language of section 537.080 that compels the conclusion that a physician who
negligently causes the premature death of a patient is immunized from wrongful death liability because, by a stroke of perverse luck, the patient also suffers
from a terminal illness.”144 Furthermore, they pointed out that, under the majority’s interpretation of section 537.080, tortfeasors are immune “from wrongful death liability when they kill the terminally ill.”145 Such an immunity is
inconsistent with the purpose of the wrongful death statute.146 Finally, the dissent stressed that the Florida, Ohio, and Iowa cases relied on by the majority
were “decided between 30 and 83 years ago [and] should not be conclusive
with respect to interpretation of the language in Missouri’s wrongful death statute.”147
Ultimately, the dissent concluded that it would be proper to reverse the
judgment and remand the case.148

V. COMMENT
Under the majority’s decision in Mickels, the Supreme Court of Missouri
essentially granted immunity to healthcare providers who negligently treat terminally ill patients. This Part first distinguishes Mickels from the previous
cases on which the court’s decision relied. Next, this Part argues that the majority’s decision is inconsistent with the purpose of Missouri’s wrongful death
statute.

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. (Teitelman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 332.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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A. Relation to Past Precedent
The majority’s decision relied on cases from Florida, Ohio, and Iowa.149
All three of these cases were decided over thirty years before Mickels, and none
of them are mandatory authority in Missouri.150 Moreover, the cases are not
entirely analogous to the situation in the instant case.
In Thompson, the Iowa Supreme Court denied recovery because there was
no evidence that the decedent would have lived any longer even if she had been
properly diagnosed with tetanus.151 The court stated that, while it is not necessary that “the causal connection between the alleged acts of malpractice and
the death of appellant’s decedent . . . be shown by direct and positive evidence,”
there must be evidence that the causation theory be “reasonably probable . . .
and more probable than any other hypothesis based on such evidence.”152 The
court found that any argument that the decedent would have lived longer
“would be pure speculation and conjecture.”153
Like in Thompson, the Supreme Court of Ohio in Cooper denied recovery
because there was not sufficient evidence that it was probable that the decedent
would have survived treatment and surgery for his injuries arising from being
hit by a truck.154 In Gooding, the Florida Supreme Court relied on Cooper,
finding that there was no “evidence of a greater than even chance of survival .
. . in the absence of negligence.”155
Mickels, however, is different from these three cases. In these cases, the
plaintiffs failed to show that the defendants could have delayed the decedents’
deaths if the decedents had been treated competently.156 On the other hand, in
Mickels, there was direct evidence that Mr. Mickels would have survived
longer if treated competently.157 There was direct evidence that Dr. Danrad
could have delayed Mr. Mickels’s death.158
In Thompson, Cooper, and Gooding, the time of death for all three decedents would not have significantly changed but for the alleged negligence.159
That was not the case in Mickels.160 While there was no evidence of the dece-

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 329 (majority opinion).
See id.
Thompson v. Anderson, 252 N.W. 117, 121 (Iowa 1934).
Id. (quoting Ramberg v. Morgan, 218 N.W. 492, 497 (Iowa 1928)).
Id.
Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., 272 N.E.2d 97, 99, 104 (Ohio
1971), overruled by Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio
1996).
155. Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1020 (Fla. 1984).
156. Id.; Cooper, 272 N.E.2d at 104; Thompson, 252 N.W. at 121.
157. Mickels v. Danrad, 486 S.W.3d 327, 328 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).
158. Id.
159. Thompson, 252 N.W. at 121; Cooper, 272 N.E.2d at 104; Gooding, 445 So. 2d
at 1020.
160. See Mickels, 486 S.W.3d at 328.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

15

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 14

858

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

dents’ probable survival in Thompson, Cooper, and Gooding, there was evidence of Mr. Mickels’s probable survival for a longer period of time had Dr.
Danrad correctly diagnosed his tumor.161 Mr. Mickels’s treating oncologist
testified that, but for Dr. Danrad’s failure to diagnose the brain tumor on December 12, 2008, it was “more likely than not that . . . [Mr. Mickels] would
have lived an additional six months on average.”162 Even though Mr. Mickels
would have died from his brain tumor regardless of when it was diagnosed, he
was still deprived of several months of his life.163 Obviously, six months is
significantly longer than the expected survival of the decedents in Thompson
and Cooper – who died the day after the alleged negligence – or the decedent
in Gooding, who died forty-five minutes after the alleged negligence.164
As noted in Judge Teitelman’s dissent, section 537.080 does not require
that a defendant’s negligence be the sole and exclusive cause of a decedent’s
death.165 While “‘the death of a person results from’ medical negligence when
the decedent would not have died ‘but for’ the alleged negligence,” the same
can be said when “a terminally ill person would not have died prematurely but
for the alleged negligence.”166 Section 537.080 allows wrongful death actions
“when death ‘results from’ negligence.”167 Mr. Mickels’s death on June 12,
2009, resulted from Dr. Danrad’s failure to diagnose his brain tumor.168
Although this survival period is less than the ten-year survival period
found to be sufficient in Green,169 six months is still a significant amount of
time that he could have lived.170 Life should not be “devalued . . . when the
days remaining are few.”171 Instead, “the law . . . should hold that very commodity to be more, rather than less, dear.”172 Even though he would have eventually died from the terminal brain tumor, there is certainly value in the six
months of life Mr. Mickels lost. In a survivorship action, the value of these six
months would be lost because damages would be limited to those accrued before Mr. Mickels’s death.173

161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
Thompson, 252 N.W. at 118; Cooper, 272 N.E.2d at 99, 104; Gooding, 445
So. 2d at 1017.
165. Mickels, 486 S.W.3d at 332 (Teitelman, J., dissenting).
166. Id. (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 537.080 (2000)).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 328 (majority opinion).
169. See Green v. Goldberg, 557 So. 2d 589, 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (per
curiam).
170. See Toker, supra note 57, at 63.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See Grizzell v. United States, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1007–08 (S.D. Ill. 2009);
see also infra Part V.B.
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B. The Purpose of Missouri’s Wrongful Death Statute
As indicated above, there are three main purposes of wrongful death
claims under section 537.080.174 First, wrongful death claims “provide compensation to bereaved plaintiffs for their loss.”175 Second, wrongful death
claims “ensure that tortfeasors pay for the consequences of their actions.”176
Finally, wrongful death claims “deter negligent acts that may lead to death.”177
As noted by Judge Teitelman in his dissenting opinion, barring the wrongful
death claim in Mickels “certainly does not advance [any of these] statutory purposes.”178
Wrongful death claims allow for damages including “the pecuniary losses
suffered by reason of the death, funeral expenses, and the reasonable value of
the services, consortium, companionship, comfort, instruction, guidance, counsel, training, and support.”179 Survivorship claims only allow for the “damages
as accrued before [the decedent’s] death and which he could have recovered
had he survived, including damages for physical and mental pain and suffering;
loss of wages, if any, from the [event] until his death; and medical and hospital
expenses resulting from the injuries.”180
While permitting Mr. Mickels’s family to recover personal injury damages under the survivorship statute allows the family some financial compensation, this compensation cannot take into account injuries like loss of consortium or loss of companionship.181 In denying such damages, the majority neglects to consider the value of Mr. Mickels’s life. Although many people may
“consider life priceless, . . . we [should not] treat it as worthless.”182 The six
months of life Mr. Mickels lost had value. Even though Mr. Mickels would
have only survived an additional six months, compensation for his lost life is
appropriate. Because Mr. Mickels lost a portion of his life due to Dr. Danrad’s
negligence, the damages recoverable in a survivorship claim are not adequate.
Because damages like loss of consortium are not recoverable, a survivorship
claim under section 537.020 fails to “provide compensation to bereaved plaintiffs for their loss.”183
Furthermore, the majority decision fails to ensure tortfeasors pay for the
consequences of their actions because it “immuniz[es] tortfeasors from wrongful death liability when they kill the terminally ill.”184
174. See supra Part III.A.
175. Mickels v. Danrad, 486 S.W.3d 327, 332 (Mo. 2016) (en banc) (Teitelman, J.,

dissenting).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. MO. REV. STAT. § 537.090 (2016).
180. Grizzell v. United States, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1007–08 (S.D. Ill. 2009).
181. See id.
182. McClurg, supra note 49, at 6.
183. Mickels, 486 S.W.3d at 332 (Teitelman, J., dissenting).
184. Id.
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The majority argues that Dr. Danrad could not be liable under a wrongful
death claim because Mr. Mickels would have died regardless of Dr. Danrad’s
negligence, and, therefore, Dr. Danrad’s negligence was not the cause of Mr.
Mickels’s death.185 But it is important to remember that everyone will die
eventually. Wrongful death claims are about accelerating the date of death.
For purposes of wrongful death claims, an act is tortious and causal if it hastens
death.186
Furthermore, in Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hospital, the Supreme
Court of Missouri held that to satisfy the requirement of proximate causation,
“the injury must be a reasonable and probable consequence of the act or omission of the defendant.”187 Additionally, “[t]o the extent the damages are surprising, unexpected, or freakish, they may not be the natural and probable consequences of a defendant’s actions.”188 Here, even though Mr. Mickels was
experiencing “numbness, blurred vision, and headaches” on December 8, 2008,
Dr. Danrad failed to make any diagnosis upon viewing Mr. Mickels’s MRI
results.189 A serious health concern going undetected was certainly a reasonable consequence of Dr. Danrad’s failure to make a diagnosis. Such consequences are not so “surprising, unexpected, or freakish” as to cut off Dr. Danrad’s liability.190
Because Dr. Danrad caused Mr. Mickels’s premature death, the majority’s decision fails to ensure that tortfeasors pay for the consequences of their
actions.191 By only being liable for a survivorship claim, Dr. Danrad is not
being held fully accountable for his negligence.192
Moreover, the majority’s decision fails to pursue the statute’s objective
of deterring negligent acts.193 Arguably, the decision has the opposite effect.
Providing such immunity from wrongful death liability could potentially encourage doctors and other healthcare providers to behave negligently when
dealing with terminally ill patients. The majority narrowly interprets section
537.080 in declaring that “Appellants cannot sue for wrongful death . . . because Dr. Danrad’s alleged negligence did not cause Mr. Mickels’ death.”194
Such a narrow interpretation “exemplif[ies] and perpetuate[s] the very evils to
be remedied” by the wrongful death statute.195 By failing to deter negligent
185. Id. at 329 (majority opinion).
186. See Collins v. Hertenstein, 90 S.W.3d 87, 96 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (“[A]n act

which accelerates death . . . causes death.”) (quoting In re Estate of Eliasen, 668 P.2d
110, 120 (Idaho 1983)).
187. Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 865 (Mo. 1993) (en
banc).
188. Id.
189. Mickels, 486 S.W.3d at 328.
190. Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 865.
191. Mickels, 486 S.W.3d at 332 (Teitelman, J., dissenting).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 331 (majority opinion).
195. Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., Inc., 300 U.S. 342, 350–51 (1937).
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acts, this interpretation is inconsistent with the “legislative policy which is itself a source of law.”196
Meeting these statutory objectives far outweighs the potential consequence of creating precedent requiring wrongful death plaintiffs to prove “that
‘but for’ the defendant’s negligence the decedent would not have died on the
specific time and date.”197 However, because death is always inevitable, this
is implied in all wrongful death cases.
While the majority finds this new element of proof to have potentially
“serious and far-reaching consequences,” such consequences pale in comparison to the ramifications of granting immunity from wrongful death liability.198
The majority notes that this element of proof would allow defendants to “argue
that, even when his . . . negligence caused the decedent’s death, some conduct
of the decedent (or even a third person) either accelerated or delayed that death
and, therefore, that conduct – not the defendant’s negligence – was the ‘but for’
cause of the decedent’s specific date and time of death.”199 But defendants use
this defense without the supposed new element of proof whenever the facts will
support such an argument.
That is not the situation in the instant case. No conduct by Mr. Mickels
accelerated his death.200 No conduct by any other third person accelerated his
death.201 Mr. Mickels died on June 12, 2009, and his death was accelerated by
six months due to Dr. Danrad’s negligence.202

VI. CONCLUSION
In Mickels v. Danrad, the Supreme Court of Missouri failed to account
for an important fact that distinguishes Mr. Mickels’s case from other wrongful
death cases: the date of Mr. Mickels’s death was hastened due to Dr. Danrad’s
negligence. In this decision, the court failed to accomplish the three main objectives of wrongful death claims. First, the Appellants were not appropriately
compensated for their loss. Second, Dr. Danrad was not held fully liable for
the consequences of his actions. Finally, the court essentially set a precedent
of immunizing doctors and other health care providers who cause the premature death of terminally ill patients from liability arising from their actions.
The majority’s ruling is inconsistent with the legislative intent of the wrongful
death statute. The decision in Mickels evinces a desire to protect health care
providers in Missouri at the expense of their patients.203
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 351.
Mickels, 486 S.W.3d at 331.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 328.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Dodson v. Ferrara, 491 S.W.3d 542, 561 (Mo. 2016) (en banc) (finding that there is a public interest in capping wrongful death damages).
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